Proxy Wars - The IRGC's Lesser Regarded and Incompetent Puppets
As the war on Iran continues, the Islamic Republic’s Shia allies have decided to enter the chat. From Iraq and Yemen, Iran-aligned militia groups have launched their own attacks on regional infrastructure as retribution for the strikes on Tehran.
(They’re mourning the loss of Ayatollah Khamenei rather like we’re mourning the demise of cut-and-paste montages made with Microsoft Paint. It’s a new era for Redline graphic design – just call us the AI-atollah!)
Back in Tehran, with Iran’s moderates sidelined, the IRGC is in charge of the shaky military command infrastructure that remains intact. And the IRGC has their hands more than full with the attempted defence of Iran’s territory.
Which leaves those pesky frenemies in Iraq and Yemen. Even at the best of times, the IRGC has had trouble controlling its wayward allies in the region: the militia groups are political animals first and foremost, with domestic constituencies to please, salaries to try and pay...or not, and local interests always trumping demands from afar. The nominal alliance between the Islamic Republic and the militias abroad as an “Axis of Resistance” is in reality far more of a relationship of convenience.
For Tehran, this nominal axis was always tough to keep aligned. And with the current war, it’s become less of an axis and more of a bent coat-hanger. Things are not good between the IRGC and their buddies abroad.
There’s obvious reasons for this. First, the IRGC is stuck in the proverbial spider-hole. They can’t make contact with their proxies without phone signals at either end drawing the attention of circling UAVs. Imagine the challenge of trying to align strategy or tactics; preserve logistical supply chains; or even transfer funds without fear of drawing an immediate drone strike on either end of the line.
The second is that the Axis of Resistance is always on the verge of pulling apart. The leaders of the Iran-aligned militias in Iraq – Ahmad al-Hamidawai, Akram al Kaabi, and Qais al-Khazali – are cut-throats; rivals for political power; and absolutely as far as is possible from being anything like friends. The Houthis in Yemen are virtually a world away, and their leader Abdel Malik al-Houthi is more or less unreachable due to constant fear of assassination by one of the Houthis’ many antagonists.
The third reason is that these groups are all a bit weird. Harakat al-Nujaba and its curiously wrinkle-free leader Akram al Kaabi are weirdly focussed on hair and beard styling. Just check out the header pic on their Twitter page:
Kata’ib Hizballah, meanwhile is reliving the 1990s with its dot.me website and some outrageously bad Photoshop. It’s like the front and back cover of a really shitty PlayStation One game:
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq we also have to tip our hat to – at least their website actually acknowledges the existence of women, highlighting the group’s various female parliamentarians. We can imagine that this relative progressiveness doesn’t sit well with HAN or KH.
As for the Houthis, well. Perhaps they’d land more missiles on targets if they spent more time on welding and assembly training (see the execrable quality of the joins and surface finish in the inset image below – cringe!) and less on painting their missile re-entry vehicles like they’re Yaser Arafat stuck inside a transparent ice cream cone.
We can only imagine how these kinds of gaffes must be received back in Tehran – at least for those who are still alive and can actually see the gaffes happening. IRGC goons like Ahmad Vahidi have spent decades trying to build up a network of foreign proxies; and now that the critical moment has arrived, the network is proving about as reliable as a Houthi missile guidance system.
Anyway, don’t go looking for any kind of truly coordinated response amongst these groups. Expect blunders, in-fighting, and forehead-slapping back in Tehran as the Axis of Resistance continues spinning out of control.
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