گرایش‌های برادرکشی

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 گرایش‌های برادرکشی

هر شاخه از نیروهای مسلح یک کشور، شاخه‌های دیگر را با دیده تحقیر می‌نگرد. ارتش‌ها فکر می‌کنند که دریانوردان همجنسگرا هستند و خلبانان منتقد رستوران هستند. نیروی دریایی فکر می‌کند که سربازان و خلبانان به ترتیب غارنشین و دیلتان هستند. نیروهای هوایی - وقتی که به این فکر نمی‌کنند که دفعه بعد به کدام رستوران بروند - آنقدر راحت هستند که به دیگران توجه زیادی نمی‌کنند.

دشمنی بین شاخه‌های مختلف نیروهای مسلح در سراسر جهان رایج است. اما در ایران، این دشمنی شکل بسیار وحشانه‌ای به خود می‌گیرد. و یک شکاف واحد در قلب آن وجود دارد: شکاف بین نیروهای مسلح منظم (ارتش) و سپاه پاسداران (سپاه).

این دو نهاد اساساً نیروهای نظامی رقابتی هستند. هر کدام نیروهای زمینی، هوایی و دریایی دارند. آنها ساختارهای فرماندهی جداگانه دارند. آنها حتی مجتمع‌های صنعتی و تحقیقاتی کامل دارند.

این دوگانگیِ ظاهری در واقع یک ویژگیِ نظام ایران است، نه یک نقص. نیروهای سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی پس از سال ۱۹۷۹ و از ترس آن شکل گرفتند که نیروهای مسلح منظم ایران هنوز همدلی‌هایی با سلطنت سرنگون‌شده داشته باشند و بنابراین تهدیدی پایدار برای انقلاب اسلامی محسوب شوند. سپاه از دل ارتش (آرتش) به‌عنوان نیرویی برای ایجاد موازنه شکل گرفت، اما همان‌طور که تاریخ معاصر نشان داده است، سپاه این «ایجاد توازن» را به حد افراط رسانده و اکنون عملاً به سرکوب و کشتار هم‌میهنان خود پرداخته است… جاوید نامان!

شایان ذکر است که در هستهٔ ارتش، وظیفه‌ای با مفهوم «جان فدای وطن» یا «جانم فدای مردم» قرار داشت، که عملاً به معنای پاسداری از مردم است — مردمی که جوهرهٔ هر کشور را تشکیل می‌دهند؛ چرا که کشوری بدون مردمش چه معنایی دارد

ایده خوبی در تئوری. اما در عمل - پس از 45 سال توسعه و گاه به گاه تلاش برای بهبود - نتیجه سیستمی است که با ناکارآمدی‌های ساختاری  در حال زجر کشیدن است: "سلسله مراتب فرماندهی متداخل، شبکه‌های لجستیکی اضافی و سیستم‌های نظامی موازی". و سپاه اکنون بیش از دو برابر بودجه ارتش را جذب می‌کند، علیرغم اینکه نیمی از پرسنل را دارد. پس تعادل برقرار نشد.

ناکارآمدی ساختاری به اندازه کافی بد است. اما بدتر از آن سم مطلقی است که رابطه بین ارتش و سپاه را مشخص می‌کند. در یک سطح، این زهر را به راحتی می‌توان درک کرد: هر کسی که کاری انجام داده است می‌داند که هیچ چیز به اندازه دادن مسئولیت‌های دقیق به یک همکار بدون تقسیم کار مشخص، شما را نسبت به او نفرت‌انگیز نمی‌کند. در سطح دیگر، رابطه بد صرفاً قبیلگی، غیرمنطقی و احمقانه است.

و این جنبه‌ها هستند که ما در درگیری فعلی شاهد آن هستیم. به جای اینکه با دشمن مشترک که اکنون وجود دارد، یکپارچه شوند، سپاه و ارتش نفرت متقابل خود را دو برابر می‌کنند.

خاموشی ارتباطات در ایران باعث می‌شود که نشانه‌های این موضوع برای خارجیان سخت دیده شود، اما گزارش‌های محدودی که وجود دارد، گویا هستند. مانند این گزارش‌ها که سپاه پاسداران از انتقال سربازان ارتش که جراحت برداشته‌اند، امتناع کرده و درخواست‌های ارتش برای تامین خون و آمبولانس را رد کرده است، علیرغم داشتن ظرفیت. و شکایات در تلگرام که تعمیرات سیستم‌های بانکی مختل شده که حقوق و مستمری اعضای ارتش و جانبازان را توزیع می‌کند، به نفع سپاه پاسداران به تعویق افتاده است.

و این فقط مسائل کوچک است. تصور کنید که هنوز گزارش نشده است - ناتوانی کامل سپاه و ارتش در تفکیک اهداف، حوادث آتش دوستانه، و فقدان عجیب همکاری. ایران در طول دو دهه گذشته در مورد آمادگی خود برای جنگ مدرن حرف‌های زیادی زده است، اما اکنون که جنگ مدرن به اینجا رسیده است، سپاه و ارتش ثابت می‌کنند که قادر به مقابله با آن نیستند.

با در نظر گرفتن این سطح از ناهماهنگی و اینکه رفع آن چه چیزی را می طلبد، احتمالاً بهتر است تا زمانی که هنوز فرصتی  

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